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GAMING - POSSIBILITY OF RE-
COVERING MONEY LosT.-[Federal]
While playing cards aboard a steam-
ship en route from New York to
San Francisco one Richter lost
$36,620 to a professional gambler.
When they arrived in San Fran-
cisco he wrote a check for the
amount of the debt payable on the
Continental Illinois Bank and Trust
Co. of Chicago. The check having
been paid in Illinois the plaintiff,
Richter, sought to recover the pay-
ment upon the interpretation of an
Illinois gambling statute (Smith-
Hurd Illinois Statutes, c. 38, §330)
which provides that any person
who shall in a game of chance lose
money or goods exceeding in value
ten dollars, and having paid it
to the winner, can recover the
same or its full value by an action
at law. However, if the loser does
not within six months su& for the
recovery of the money, "it shall be
lawful for any person to sue for,
and recover treble the value of the
money, goods, chattels and other
things; one half to the use of the
county, and the other to the per-
son suing." The Court based its
decision on a conflicts of law rule
to the effect that "a State statute
which allows a recovery by the
loser against the winner of money
paid, within the State, in satisfac-
tion of a gambling debt, has no ap-
plication if the gambling debt was
incurred in another jurisdiction,
unless by the laws of that other
jurisdiction the debt was illegal or
void.". In view of the fact that
there was nothing in the declara-
tion to show what the law was
where the debt was incurred a de-
murrer to the complaint was sus-
tained. Richter v. Empire Trust
Co., 20 F. Supp. 289.
Despite the fact that the actual
decision was based upon the con-
flict of laws, the case gives rise to
an interesting problem of the re-
sult of criminal statutes upon the
civil liability of gamblers. Gaming
is an agreement between two or
more persons to risk their money
or property in a contdst or chance
of any kind where one may be the
gainer and the other the loser.
Portis v. State, 27 Ark. 360 (1872).
At early common law in England
gambling contracts, when fair and
free from cheating, were assumed
by the courts, without discussion,
to be valid and the winner was
allowed to recover his profits.
Sherbon v. Colebach, 2 Vent. 175,
86 Eng. Reprints 377 (1671). How-
ever, when such contracts were
contra bones mores (against good
morals) they were void and unin-
forcible. Atherfold v. Beard, 2 T.




Later the courts were not in-
clined to entertain actions based
on gambling contracts. This was
the result of a theory of discretion
upon the part of the trial judge,
who tried such cases only after all
others were disposed of, and the
appellate court in some instances
even went so far as to intimate
that the trial judge would have
discretion to refuse to try such
cases at all. Brown v. Leeson, 2 H.
Bl. 43, 126 Eng. Reprints 4f9 (1792);'
Egerton v. Furzeman, 1 C. & P. 613,
17: Eng. Reprints 1338 (1825);
Thornton v. Thackeray, 2 Y. & J.
156, 148 Eng. Reprints 872 (1828).
This doctrine was repudiated in
Evans v. Jones, 5 M. & W. 77, 151
Eng. Reprints 34 (1839) and the
courts returned to the original rule
that such contracts were valid and
actionable, except certain classes
of wagering contracts; among
which are those forbidden by stat-
ute; those prejudicial to the inter-
ests and feelings of third persons,
Elthan v. Kingsman, 1 B. & Aid.
683, 106 Eng. Reprints 251 (1818)
(wager that one of two public car-
riers would be used by a certain
person); those prejudicial to the
public peace, Gilbert v. Sykes, 16
East 150, 104 Eng. Reprints 1045
(1812) (wager on the life of Na-
poleon); and lastly those contrary
to public policy, Hartley v. Rice,
10 East 22, 104 Eng. Reprints 683
(1808) (restraint on marriage);
Lacaussade v. White, 2 Esp. 629,
170 Eng. Reprints 478 (1798)
(wager based on a war).
In America a number of the
States refused to adopt the Com-
mon Law of England on gambling
contracts because unsuited to the
conditions and institutions in the
new country, and, as a result, all
gambling contracts were declared
void by their common law. Eldred
v. Mallory, 2 Colo. 320 (1870);
Cleveland v. Wolff, 7 Kan. 184
(1871) ;Love v. Harvey, 11 Mass.
80 (1873); Beattie v. Hoyt, 3 Mont.
140 (1878).
In others it was held that the
English Statutes against gaming
passed prior to the American Rev-
olution, were in force in their jur-
isdiction as part of the common
law, -(Higdon v. Heard, 14 Ga. 255
(1853); Gough v. Pratt, 9 Md. 526
(1856); Evans v. Cook, 11 Nev. 69
(1876)) or as adopted by statutes
in general terms. An example of
such a statute is to be found in
Smith-Hurd, Illinois Statutes, c. 28,
§1, which says "That the common
law of England, so far as the same
is applicable and of a general na-
ture, and all statutes or acts of the'
British Parliament made in aid of,
and to supply the defects of the
common law, prior to the fourth
year of James the First,. . . and
are of a general nature, and not
local to that kingdom, shall be the
rule of decision, and shall be con-
sidered as of full force until re-
pealed by legislative authority."
Also see Sardo v. Fougeres, 21,
Fed. Cas. 490 (1829); In re Opin-
ion of the Justices, 73 N. H. 625,
63 Atl. 505 (1906). Still another
class of states held that the com-
mon law of England on the subject
of gambling contracts was in force,
and that gambling contracts not of
the forbidden classes were valid,
and enforceable by their common
law. Grant v. Hamilton, 10 Fed.
Cas. 978 (1842); Ross v. Green, 4
Harr (Del.) 308 (1843); Campbell
v. Richardson, 10 Johns. (N. Y.)
406 (1813).
It is only natural that on a sub-
ject so near to the public interests
and prejudices, the legislatures
would soon alter the Common Law.
Legislation in England slowly be-
)14 RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
gan to confine and restrict gam-
bling. Thirty-Three, Henry VIII,
chapter 9, did not make any game
unlawful, but only made it unlaw-
ful to keep a gaming house. Six-
teen Charles II, chapter 7 directed
its force against fraud and deceit
in play, still not holding gaming of
itself unlawful. Excessive and*
fraudulent playing were made an
indictable offense by Nine Anne,
chapter 14. The Twelfth George
II, chapter 28 was the first statute
to specifically name the playing of
certain enumerated games as un-
lawful. Thirteen George II added
more games to the list of unlawful
ones. The game of roulette was
made illegal by 18 George II, chap-
ter 34, §f. Such was the state of
the law on gaming until Eighth
and Nine Victoria, chapter 109
(1845) which legalized all games of
skill but kept the penalties to be
imposed on unlawful gaming. This
statute expressly repealed 16
Charles II, 9 Anne, and 18 George
II. Jenks v. Turpins, 13 Q. B. D.
505 (1884). From these statutes
it may be assumed that where a
contract does not violate the crim-
inal statute the winner can enforce
the d~bt against the loser.
In the United States legislation
has been of three distinct types.
A few of the States allow gaming,
and a gambling contract in them
is legal and binding upon the par-
ties. Nevada held gaming illegal
until 1931 when a statute was
passed which permitted the licens-
ing of gambling by the sheriff of
the particular county where the
gambling was to take place. One
can readily see the effect of this
statute by picturing Reno, which
is a haven not only for divorcees
but for gamblers as well, thus in-
flicting upon the soon-to-be di-
vorced husbands the duty of pay-
ing their former wife's gambling
losses as well as alimony. The sec-
ond group of states hold gambling
to be illegal and any contract re-
sulting thereof void, the civil lia-
bility being in pari delicto, leaving
the parties as they were with no
redress in a court of law.
The last group have statutes
making gaming illegal, but they
also have a provision whereby the
loser or a third person can recover
from the winner the money lost.
These statutes are patterned after
the Ninth Statute of Anne, chapter
f4, which gave to the loser of a
gambling contract the right to re-
sort to Equity for recovery. The
state statutes, however, are by no
means uniform. Some allow only
the loser to recover (Compiled
Statutes of Nebraska, c. 28, §945,
permitting only heirs, legal repre-
sentatives or creditors to recover;
New Mexico Statutes Annotated,
c. 58, §101); others put a time lim-
itation on his right to recover and
allow, after that has elapsed, any
person to sue and recover three
times the amount owed. Smith-
Hurd Illinois Statutes, c. 38, §330.
This latter group is also divided,
the greater majority of the states
allow the third person to keep the
penal amount sued for; and second,
those which require that one-half
of the amount recovered be turned
over to some county or state-sup-
ported institution. In this latter
group are Illinois (Smith-Hurd,
c. 38, §330), New York (Cahill's
Consolidated Statutes, c. 41, §995),
New Jersey (Compiled Statutes, c.
85, §6) and Ohio (Throckmorton's
Code Annot. §5966).
The Statutes which allow re-
covery only to the loser are merely
remedial (Sofas v. McKee, 100
Conn. 541, 124 Atl. 380 (1924);
Mann v. Gordon, 1 N. M. 652, 110
RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
Pac. 1043 (1910); Wall v. Metro-
politan Stock Exchange Co., 168
Mass. 282, 46 N. E. 1062 (1897),
and their purpose was to discour-
age gambling by making the win-
nings insecure, and should not be
too narrowly construed.
The second group are statutes
which are both remedial and penal,
Cole v. Grove, 14 Mass. 471
(1883); Huntington v. Attrill, 146
U. S. 657 (1892); Wilson v. Head,
184 Mass. 515, 69 N. E. 317 (1:904).
But penal statutes are not enlarged
by intendment, and acts not ex-
pressly forbidden by them cannot
be reached merely because of their
resemblance, or because they be
equally and in the same way de-
moralizing and injurious. Shaw v.
Clark, 49 Mich. 384, 13 N. W. 786
(1882).
It seems that criminal laws
against gambling are to a great ex-
tent ineffective and unenforceable
due to the public feeling and po-
litical corruption that is prevalant
in our larger cities. Also as a gen-
eral rule the civil liability result-
ing from gambling has little effect
on the prevalence of the crime.
If the parties are left'in pari delicto
the civil law can have no effect.
The latter type of statute giving
the loser or a third person the
right to recover money lost at
gambling would be the most effec-
tive way for a civil law to enforce
criminal gambling laws if it were
not for certain practical difficulties.
If a third party actually succeeded
in.getting judgments against gam-
bling syndicates for treble the
amount of their winnings it would
wipe out gambling and gambling
syndicates in a short time. Such
a third person could make a for-
tune and the treasury of the state
or some state institution would be-
gin to resemble an endowment
fund of some of our largest uni-
versities. However, this possibil-
ity has its drawback in the fear of
all good citizens of retaliation by
violence. If gambling syndicates
were absent from the scene in most
cities such a statute as the one in
Illinois would be more effective in




FACTO LAws.-[Supreme Court] A
Washington state court convicted
the defendants of the crime of
grand larceny. At the time of the
offense, the Washington statute
provided that sentence should be
fixed by the court at a definite term
within a fifteen year -possible
maximum. The statute also pro-
vided for an 'earlier release b;
parole at the expiration of a mini-
mum term. A later statute passed
after the commission of the offense,
but before sentence, required the
court to impose the maximum pro-
vided by the law. The Board of
Prison Terms and Paroles was then
to fix the duration of the prison-
er's confinement. A sentence im-
posed on the defendants under the
later statute was sustained by the
highest state court. On appeal to
the United States Supreme Court
there was a reversal. Held: The
amended statute was unconstitu-
tional as an ex post facto law when
applied retroactively to an offense
committed before it was enacted.
Constitution of the United States
Art. 1 §10, Lindsey v. Washington,
301 U. S.'397 (1937).
Past construction of the Consti-
tution has outlined rather definitely
the limitation of the phrase ex post
facto. It has been held that the
restraint is solely upon the exer-
916
cise of legislative power and does
not prevent a court from departing
from a prior decision even if it
would be to the detriment of a de-
fendant who committed an offense
when the prior ruling was in force.
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309
(1915); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U. S.
150 (1912). Further, from the first
significant interpretation of ex post
facto it has been held to apply only
to criminal law. Calder v. Bull,
3 Dall. 386, 1 Law. Ed. 648 (1798).
Cooley in his treatise, however,
stated that the confinement of ex
post facto to criminal law was in
direct opposition to what seemed to
be the natural meaning of the term.
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
Vol. 1, p. 541. Although there
have been many attempts to ex-
pouse a formula which would serve
as a measuring stick in determin-
ing when a law is ex post facto,
probably none has been more ef-
fectively applied than the one laid
down in Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.
S. 221 (1882), e. g. ". . . any law
is ex post facto which is enacted
after an offense is committed and
which in relation to it or its con-
sequences alters the situation of
the accused to his disadvantage."
If the various states in the union
had all adopted a plan of prison
sentence which prescribed a set
term for each offense, there would
be little difficulty encountered in
determining whether or not a new
statute fixing a different term was
disadvantageous to the accused.
Fortunately, as most criminal psy-
chologists will testify, this is not
the usual type of statute, but on
the contrary considerable leeway
is allowed for the individual case.
There are maximum and minimum
provisions, indeterminate sentence
provisions and countless modes of
parole. Under such provisions it
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often becomes difficult to ascertain
whether a newly enacted statute is
more or less advantageous to an
accused from the standpoint of
actual length of incarceration. In
many cases it would seem that an
accurate determination could only
be made by looking to the applica-
tion of the newly enacted statute
in the particular case before the
court. The Supreme Court has
held, however, that the ex post
facto nature of a statute is to be
determined by the standard erected
in the statute and not the actual
sentence imposed on the complain-
ing defendant. 11 Amer. Juris.
1184.'
In view of the fact that a statute
fixing a more advantageous sen-
tence for an accused is not ex post
facto (State v. Malloy, 237 U. S.
180 (1915)), a statute diminishing
the minimum period of imprison-
ment does not violate the consti-
tution. People v. Hayes, 140 N. Y.
484, 35 N. E. 951 (1894). Also, a
reduction of a maximum sentence
is not ex post facto. People ex tel.
Liebowitz v. Warden of New York
Penitentiary, 174 N. Y. S. 823
(1919). Hovever, where a statute
reduced the maximum sentence,
but increased the minimum, the
statute was said to be ex post facto
because the accused was deprived
of the possibility of a smaller sen-
tence which he might have gotten
under the old law in force when
the offense was committed. Gar-
vey v. People, 6 Colo. 569 (1883).
A law shortening the time be-
tween sentence and execution has
been held ex post facto on the
theory that a person desires to live
as long as possible, (In re Tyson,
13 Colo. 482, 22 Pac. 810 (1889)),
and on the same reasoning a new
statute extending the time between
sentence and execution has been
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considered advantageous to the
prisoner. Rooney v. North Dakota,
196 U. S. 319 (1905). A law de-
priving a life termer of the bene-
fits of parole was considered ex
post facto when retroactively ap-
plied. State v. Board of Paroles,
1"55 La. 699, 99 So. 534 (1924).
Also, the repeal of a statute which
allowed a defendant to escape a
death sentence by pleading guilty
to a first degree murder charge was
held ex post facto when applied to
a defendant who committed murder
while the statute was in force.
Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221
(1882). On the other hand a stat-
ute enhancing the punishment for
a second or subsequent offense is
not ex post facto merely because
the first or prior offense occurred
before the statute was enacted.
Carlesi v. New York, 233 U. S. 51
(1914). An indeterminate sentence
law, operating retroactively, has
been quite generally held not to be
ex post facto if falling within the
maximum and minimum sentence
of the prior law. The new inde-
terminate s entence law was said
merely to prescribe a different
method of fixing the period of in-
carceration of the prisoner. Davis
v. State, 152 Ind. 37, 51 N. E. 928
(1878); Commonwealth v. Kalck,
239 Pa. 533, 87 A. 61 (1913). Con-
tra:. Ex Parte Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 171
Pac. 958 (1918); State v. Callaghan,
109 La. 931, 33 So. 931 (1903).
Reverting now to the instant
case, on the fact of the newly en-
acted statute it would seem more
disadvantageous to the defendant
than the former statute, for the
defendant under the new procedure
is automatically given the maxi-
mum sentence while'under the old
statute a definite term was to be
fixed somewhere between the
maximum and a minimum. Under
both statutes there is provision for
parole at an earlier date than the
sentence fixed by the court. Under
both statutes there is possibility
that a defendant might serve a full
15 year term, but under the earlier
procedure a defendant might get a
reduction from the maximum, first,
when the judge set the definite
sentence, and second, by way of
parole later. Under the later en-
acted statute the defendant could
look only to the Parole Board for a
reduction in term from the maxi-
mum sentence. The newly en-
acted statute clearly seems more
disadvantageous to an accused for
he is deprived of the possibility
that the judge, when making the
sentence after the trial, will re-
duce the term.
GERALD MILLnA.
EvmENcE-ADMisSION OF PRIOR OR
SUBSEQUENT CRIMINAL CONDUCT OF
A DEFENDANT IN A CREIINAL CASE.
-[North Carolina] The defen-
dant was found guilty of conspiracy
to rob and robbery. The alleged
co-conspirator, after entering a
plea of- guilty turned state's wit-
ness. On cross examination the
co-consphator was impeached and
thereupon as a means of corrobo-
rating his testimony the state in-
troduced evidence that the defen-
dant and the co-conspirator, after
the offense charged, conspired to
and did burn an automobile with
intent to defraud the insurer. The
defendant objected to the evidence
of the subsequent crime, but the
trial court admitted it on the
ground that it showed intent. On
appeal affirmed. State v. Flowers,
211' N. C. 721, 192 S. E. 110 (1937).
In criminal trials evidence show-
ing the commission by the defen-
dant of a separate and independent
crime from the one for which he
is being tried is generally inadmis-
sable. People v. Goldman, 318 Ill.
77, 148 N. E. 873 (1925); Johnson
v. State, 19 Ala. App. 141, 95 So.
583 (1933). The reason for ex-
cluding evidence of prior or sub-
sequent crimes is probably two-
fold. First, the admission of such
evidence tends to violate the rule
against allowing the state to intro-
duce the bad character of the de-
fendant before he has put his good
character in issue. This rule has
its foundation in that, "it is very
difficult for juries to understand
clearly the precise purpose for
which such testimony is allowed
and more difficult still for them not
to be influenced in making up their
verdict by the general impression
of the testimony rather than by the
particular effect intended for it to
have." State v. Jeffries, 117 N. C.
727, 728, 23 S. E. 163 (1895). The
second and more important reason
for excluding the evidence is that
proof of another crime committed
by a defendant is only circumstan-
tial evidence that he committed the
crime in question. As circumstan-
tial evidence it will ,be admitted
only if its relevancy outweighs its
prejudicial effect. There can be
little doubt of the prejudicial effect
on the jury when evidence of an-
other crime committed by the de-
fendant is introduced. It is gen-
erally felt that such evidence is not
sufficiently relevant to warrant its
admission for there is a logical im-
propriety in inferring from the
commission of one crime, such as
rape, that the defendant committed
a second crime such as bank rob-
bery.
Nevertheless in certain situations
where a logical inference can be
drawn the law has been crystalized
into exceptions. Thus where in-
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tent is in issue, as no intent to
steal in larceny, evidence of an-
other similar crime of larceny prior
to the one in question may be in-
troduced to show that the taking
was not innocently done. People
v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 468, 14 N. E. 319
(1887). Also, where knowledge is
in issue, as in receiving stolen
goods, proof of a prior commission
of a similar crime will be allowed
circumstantially to show knowledge
that the goods were stolen in the
case being tried. Sapir v. United
States, 174 Fed. 219 (C. C. A. 2d,
1909). The recent notorious poison
case involving Anna Hahn, illus-
trates another exception where
other crimes can be introduced to
show a scheme or design involved
in both cases.
In the instant case the court said
that it admitted the evidence of the
subsequent conspiracy to defraud
an insurance company to prove the
intent necessary in the crime of
conspiracy to rob. Intent does not
seem to be the gist of the crime
of conspiracy, but rather the com-
bining or associating of an unlaw-
ful purpose. But even assuming
that intent to commit an unlawful
act was in issue it would seem that
the intent involved in the two
crimes was different for one crime
involved an intent to defraud an
insurance company and the other
case an intent to rob. Thus on the
intent issue the crimes were not
"similar" and the court seems to
have erred.
The evidence of the subsequent
conspiracy might have been intro-
duced on the analogy to the sex
cases, for in both situations the
criminal association is the gist of
the crime. In adultery cases evi-
dence is admissible of prior or sub-
sequent acts of adultery between
the same person. People v. Peter-
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son, 102 Cal. 239, 36 Pac. 436
(1916); Commonwealth v. Bell, 166
Pa. 405, 31 Ati. 123 (1895). The
admission is rationalized by rea-
soning that evidence of another
sexual relationship with the same
person indicates a propensity be-
tween the parties to associate in
this way and consequently there is
a logical propriety in assuming
from the past act, that the asso-
ciation in question took place. Al-
though there would seem to be
less of a propensity to conspire
with the same person than to en-
gage in sexual relations, the likeli-




THE STATE TO APPAL.-[Supreme
Court] The defendant was in-
dicted for murder in the first de-
gree in the State of Connecticut
and was found guilty of murder in
the second degree. The State with
the permission of the trial judge
pursuant to statute (Conn. Gen.
Stat. (1930) §6494) appealed. The
appellate court of Connecticut re-
versed the judgment for errors of
law and granted a new trial (State
v. Palko, 121 Conn. 669, 186 Atl.
657 (1936) in which the jury found
him guilty of murder in the first
degree and the court sentenced
him to punishment of death. The
Supreme Court of Errors of Con-
necticut affirmed the conviction
and upheld the statute as not vio-
lating either the Constitution of
Connecticut or of the United
States. State v. Palko, 122 Conn.
529, 191 Atl. 320 (1937). On ap-
peal to the Supreme Court of the
United States, affirmed. Held: A
statute permitting appeals in crim-
inal cases by the state is not a
denial of due process guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United
States. Palko v. State of Connecti-
cut, 58 S. Ct. 149 (1937).
Under the Connecticut statute
appeals by the state lie for all
errors of law in the same manner
and effect as if appealed by the
accused. The Minnesota view, di-
rectly oppbsed, does not permit an
appeal by the state under any cir-
cumstances even on a point of law
before the actual trial. State v.
McGrorty, 2 Minn. 17 (1858). Be-
tween these two extremes the
states have reached a variety of
results. Some state statutes provide
for a limited appeal by the prose-
cution after the defendant has been
convicted. In Illinois appeal by the
state is a matter of right after a
conviction in a quasi-criminal case.
Baldwin v. City of Chicago, 68 IMl.
418 (1873). In Indiana an appeal
is granted to the state if the Su-
preme Court can render a decision
upon a matter of law without pass-
ing upon the facts of the case.
The State v. Overholser, 69 Ind. 144
(1879). In Arkansas an appeal lies
on behalf of the state to secure a
correct and uniform administra-
tion of the law but without preju-
dice to the accused. State v. Smith,
94 Ark. 368, 126 S. W. 1057 (1910).
The majority of states do not allow
an appeal by the prosecution after
the trial has begun, although most
state statutes do provide for some
degree of appeal by the state after
an indictment has been quashed.
In an early Maryland decision it
was recognized that for purposes
of "uniformity of decision, it is
right and proper" for the state to
appeal after an indictment has been
quashed. The State -v. Buchanan,
5 Harr. & J. 317, 330 (1821). Thus
also an appeal may be had by the
state in Alabama if the constitu-
tionality of a statute is questioned.
State v. Street, 117 Ala. 203, 23 So.
807 (T897). In Michigan the judg-
ment in favor of the defendant may
be reviewed in behalf of the state
providing the appeal is taken be-
fore the verdict. People v. Swift,
59 Mich. 541, 26 N. W. 694 (1886)."
For a summary of the law in all
jurisdictions in regard to the right
of appeal by the state from quashed
indictments see (1935) 92 A. L. R.
1137. In the federal courts prior
to the passage of any legislation by
Congress it was held that under
the Fifth Amendment a writ of
error would not lie on behalf of
the United States. United States
v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310 (189f).
Since 1907 a limited right of ap-
peal is allowed the federal gov-
emnment. (18 U. S. C. A. §682.)
The Connecticut Constitution
contains no provision against
double jeopardy although one is
found in the constitutions of most
states and in the Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United
States. Probably the reason why
more state legislatures have not
passed statutes similar to the Con-
necticut provision allowing the
state a writ of error after the de-
fendant has been tried is the fear
based upon earlier decisions that
such a statute would be unconsti-
tutional as violating the double
jeopardy provision of the state
constitution. The principle of
double jeopardy should not bar
appeals by the state since logically
and rationally there is but one
jeopardy and one trial and the sec-
ond trial after appeal by the state
is not a new case but is a legal
disposition of the same original
case tried in the first instance.
State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 Atl.
1110 (1"894). By a decision of five
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to four, in Kepner v. United States,
195 U. S. 100 (1894), the provisions
of the Philippine Law taken from
the Bill of Rights of the Constitu-
tion of the United States were
construed to prohibit an appeal by
the United States after a verdict of
acquittal. In a cogent dissent writ-
ten by Justice Holmes the same
reasoning was followed as in State
v. Lee, supra. Under the latter
view there is but one continuing
jeopardy from the beginning to the
end of the cause which is not lim-
ited by any "rule that a man may
not be tried twice in the same
case." Kepner v. United States,
supra at 134.
Reliance on the doctrine of
double jeopardy to prevent an ap-
peal by the state for errors of law
in trial results in an absurd situa-
tion. If the result favors the de-
fendant then the determination is
final and conclusive regardless of
error, but if it favors the state then
it is subject to appeal if the de-
fendant is so inclined. If the state
is allowed an appeal, criminal de-
fense counsel will realize that vic-
tory is not complete with an ac-
quittal won by unfair tactics, or
improper argument, and that suc-
cess in getting unsound rulings
may cost the defendant his favor-
able verdict. See Miller, Appeals
by the State in Criminal Cases
(f926) 36 Yale L. J. 486. The usual
reasoning of the cases which hold
that the constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy is violated
if the state appeals is that other-
wise an avenging sovereign could
appeal until the defendant was con-
victed. State v. Jones, 7 Ga. 422,
425 (1849); State v. Solomons, 14
Tenn. 246 (1834). To this argu-
ment the observation of Justice
Holmes is sound. "At the present
time in this country, there is more
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danger that criminals will escape
justice than that they will be sub-
jected to tyranny." Kepner v.
United States, supra at 134.
Since the accused in the Palko
case could not allege any infringe-
ment of double jeopardy under the
Connecticut Constitution he con-
tended that the Connecticut pro-
cedure was a denial of the due.
process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. He asserted further
that whatever is forbidden by the
Fifth Amendment is forbidden by
the Fourteenth also. It has been
held that the rights guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment are not auto-
matically embodied in the Four-
teenth Amendment. Hurtado v.
California, 110 U. S. 51'6 (1883).
However, in Twining v. New Jer-
sey, 211 U. S. .78 (1908), the court
held that "it is possible that some
of the personal rights safeguarded
by the first eight Amendments
against national action may also be
safeguarded against state action,
because a denial of them would be
a denial of due process of law . ..
If this is so, it is not because those
rights are enumerated in the first
eight Amendments, but because
they are of such a nature that they
are included in the conception of
due process of law." Twining v.
New Jersey, supra at 99.
In determining whether an ac-
cused has been deprived of his life
or liberty without due process of
law the Supreme Court has held
that a fair hearing must be granted
to the accused although a particu-
lar form of procedure is not re-
quired to be adopted by the state
"so long as it appears that the ac-
cused has had sufficient notice of
the accusation and an adequate op-
portunity to defend himself in the
prosecution." Rogers v. Peck, 199
U. S. 425, 435 (1905); Walker v.
Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90 (1*75); Frank
v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 326
(1914); Holmes v. Conway, 241 U.
S. 624 (1915). But the federal gov-
ernment should leave to the states
"the right to decide for themselves
what shall be the form and char-
acter of the procedure." Maxwell
v. Dow, 176 U. S. 606, 605 (1899);
In re Converse, 137 U. S. 624, 632
(1890). It is not to be presumed
that if the freedom of a person is
improperly restricted "that the
state authorities will not afford the
necessary relief." Rogers v. Peck,
supra at 434. Nor does the Four-
teenth Amendment "profess to se-
cure to all persons in the United
States the benefit of the same laws
and remedies. Great diversities in
these respects may exist in two
-states separated only by an imagi-
nary line." Missouri V. Lewis, 101
U. S. 22, 31 (1879). The remedy
if any exists to alter the procedure
is with the state legislature as "the
power of the people ought not to be
fettered, their sense of responsi-
bility lessened, and their capacity
for sober and restraine.d self-gov-
ernment weakened by a forced
construction of the Federal Con-
stitution." Twining v. New Jersey,
supra at 114.
Another frequently applied test
to determine if due process has
been violated has been to inquire
whether the state action violates
"fundamental principles of liberty
and justice which lie at the base of
all our civil and political institu-
tions and hot infrequently are
designated as 'law of the land.'"
Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312,
316 (1926). In applying the test of
fundamental principles the court
has sounded the warning that the
rights of the state to regulate its
procedure and their concept of
policy should not to readily, lightly
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or hastily be superseded on the
ground that they deny due process
since opinions may differ as to
policy of fairness and the meaning
of due process should not be
strained because the Supreme
Court may think the right to be of
great value. Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U. S. 102, 122 (1933),
noted (1934) 24 J. Crim. L. 1101;
Twining v. New Jersey, supra at
113.
In the application of these prin-
ciples by the Supreme Court the
results have all followed the prin-
ciple that liberty and justice can
not be denied by the states to the
particular defendant. Thus it has
been held to be a denial of due
process if a crimnial conviction is
procured solely by the use of testi-
mony known to the state authori-
ties to be perjured, Mooney v.
Halohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1934),
noted (1935) 25 J. Crim. L. 943;
or if the assistance of counsel is
denied in a capital case, Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), noted
(1933) 23 J. Crim. L. 841; or if a
conviction is procured by confes-
sions extorted by torture, Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1935),
noted (1936) 27 J. Crim. L. 125; or
if the trial is under mob domina-
tion, Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S.
86 (1922); but see also .Frank v.
Mangum, supra, where under sim-
ilar facts the determination by the
state court was given great if not
conclusive weight; or if the state
statute creates a presumption of
criminality that is arbitrary and
unreasonable, Manley v. Georgia,
279 U. S. 1 (1928); or if the de-
fendant is tried before' a judge
having a direct, personal and sub-
stantial interest in conviction,
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510
(1"926).
It has been held not to be a de-
nial of due process to indict by
information rather than by grand-
jury, Hurtado v. California, supra;
to take away the privilege against
self-incrimination, Twining v. New
Jersey, supra; or to provide for
trial by jury of eight, Maxwell v.
Dow, supra; or a struck jury in a
criminal case, Brown v. New Jer-
sey, 175 U. S. 172, 175 (1899); or
to be tried by the court after waiv-
ing jury trial, Hallinger v. Davis,
146 U. S. 314, 31'9 (1892); or to
deny to the defendant the privilege
of being present at a view, Snyder
v. Massachusetts, supra; or for the
state to limit the right of appeal,
McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684,
687 (1893); or if the highest state
court renders an erroneous deci-
sion while acting within its juris-
diction, In re Converse, supra; or
upon a question of law holds con-
trary to prior decisions, Patterson
v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 461
(1906).
The Palko case decided that an
appeal by the state for errors of
law is not a denial of due process.
It is hoped that other courts will
follow the lead of the Supreme
Court in this case in .making con-
stitutional, and other guarantees,
depend as far as possible, on sub-
stance rather than form. Whether
a statute which gives an unlimited
right of appeal to the state includ-
ing the right to appeal from a
verdict of acquittal not supported
by the evidence although the trial
is free from legal error would vio-
late due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment is not an-
swered by the Palko case. If the
reasoning of Justice Holmes in
Kepner v. United States, supra, is
followed it is clear that there would
not be a violation of double jeop-
ardy since he would limit the doc-
trine to double jeopardy to forbid
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a trial in a new and independent
case where the defendant had al-
ready been tried for the offense.
To force an accused to be acquitted
in a trial where the verdict is sup-
ported by the weight of the evi-
dence might reasonably be said to
violate his fundamental liberties
guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, especially.in view of
the much greater hardship which
would be imposed in this situation
than where the trial is required to
be only free from legal errors.
However aside from constitutional
difficulties, other factors should be
considered before a state legislature
should give the prosecution either
a right to appeal on the weight of
the evidence or for errors of law.
The hardship involved for the de-
fendant in the expense of appeal
and the indictment hanging over
his head for an indefinite period,
as well as the desirability of
finality of the judgment should be
considered. Administrative ex-
pediency should also be weighed.
The number of such appeals as
compared with the number of cases
coming to the prosecuting authori-
ties which cannot even be tried be-
cause of inadequate facilities for
trial might be urged as a reason for
not giving the prosecution even
more work after a jury has ac-
quitted the defendant. These con-
siderations to some extent counter-
balance the unfairness to the state
of giving the accused the advantage
of all errors which take place dur-
ing the trial.
GEORGE WILLIAm ENGELTER.
